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There’s no time like the present: the cost of delaying
retirement saving
Alistair Byrne David Blake, Andrew Cairns, Kevin Dowd
1. Introduction
As state pensions in many countries become less generous relative to average earnings and
the provision of occupational defined benefit (DB) pension plans becomes less common,
defined contribution (DC) pension plans have become an increasingly important retirement
saving vehicle. In most DC plans, the individual has important decisions to make in terms
of whether to join, when to join, how much to pay into the plan and how to invest the
contributions.
The later an individual begins contributing to a DC pension plan, other things being equal,
the larger the contributions he or she will have to pay to ensure an adequate retirement
income. Interrupting contributions can also lead to a substantially reduced pension. In this
paper, we use a stochastic simulation model to estimate the likely distribution of retirement
incomes from a variety of alternative DC pension plan participation profiles. In particular, we
show the cost in terms of higher contributions of deferring pension plan membership and of
having an interrupted labor market participation history.
Our results provide serious cause for concern: they indicate that the contribution rates
required to generate reasonable pension outcomes are often high, and sometimes well beyond
what most individuals would be able to afford, given their other financial commitments. Our
study therefore has an important role to play in educating employees about these implications
and helping them develop realistic retirement saving plans.
2. Evidence on delayed pension plan participation
Many individuals choose not to contribute to a pension plan. For example, the National
Association of Pension Funds Annual Survey of UK plans (NAPF, 2004) shows that where
membership is not automatic, on average only 58% of eligible employees join their employ-
er’s DC pension plan. Some of the employees who have not joined might, of course, be
contributing to their own personal pension plan, but in most cases they will have decided not
to save for a pension, or to defer saving to a later stage in their career.
There is evidence that older workers are more likely to be members of their employer’s
pension plan. Office for National Statistics (ONS) data for the UK for 2003 show that
occupational pension plan participation rates are positively related to tenure with the
employer: the participation rate for employees who are eligible to join their employer’s
pension plan and who have less than two years’ service with the employer is 61%, while the
comparable figure for employees with service of five years or more is 91%.1 More direct
evidence of a link between age and pension plan participation comes from a study by Nyce
(2005), which examined 48 US 401(k) DC pension plans covering over 300,000 employees.
The results, some of which are reproduced in Table 1, show that participation rates rise with
both age and income. Individuals with higher incomes are more likely to participate in the
pension plan than those on lower incomes, but even after controlling for income, participa-
tion rates are higher among older workers.
Table 1 Participation rates in 401(k) plans by worker’s age and income
Income Age 21–29 Age 30–39 Age 40–49 Age 50–59 Average
$25–34.9k 62.7 70.9 73.7 78.7 71.2
$45–54.9k 84.8 86.9 86.8 87.9 86.7
$75–99.9k 83.9 90.6 91.3 91.3 90.4
Total 62.7 75.3 78.1 80.3 74.7
Note: Percentage of eligible workers who have joined the plan.
Source: extracted from Table 3 of Nyce (2005).
3. Pensions in life-cycle financial planning
Standard economic theory offers an explanation as to why individuals may choose not to
save at certain points in their working life. The life-cycle theory of Ando, Brumberg and
Modigliani (Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954; Ando & Modigliani, 1957), and Friedman’s
(1957) permanent income hypothesis both imply that individuals smooth consumption over
their lifetimes. In essence, in each period an individual can consume up to the annuity value
of his or her expected wealth, and saving will take place only when current income exceeds
this annuity value. From this perspective, a decision to defer retirement saving could simply
represent a view that income will be higher in future. However, life-cycle theories have been
troubled by evidence that many households fail to maintain their preretirement level of
consumption in retirement, which suggests they might not have saved enough to properly
smooth their lifetime spending. For instance, Banks, Blundell and Tanner (1998) find a drop
in consumption at retirement that cannot be explained fully by standard consumption
smoothing models. Some of the reduction in consumption expenditure is a natural conse-
quence of withdrawal from the labor market: for example, travel costs to work are no longer
incurred. However, another possible explanation for this drop in consumption is that mem-
bers of these households are surprised by how low their pension is and are forced to adjust
their consumption accordingly.
Behavioral economics provides an alternative view that suggests decisions to defer saving
are driven by behavioral biases and thus may not represent optimal behavior. For example,
Thaler (1994) argues life-cycle theory fails to consider bounded rationality, which suggests
individuals cannot do the multiperiod optimization calculations that are required for life-
cycle saving, and bounded self-control, which implies individuals are unable to follow
through with previously identified plans to save rather than consume; “Real people have
trouble both in figuring out how much to save and in implementing any given goal” (Thaler,
1994, p. 189). Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (1998, p. 93) suggest that individuals have
a “systematic tendency to err. . . in the direction of instant gratification” which they explain
in terms of personal long-term discount rates being lower than short-term ones.2
Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001) found, using the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics and the Consumer Expenditure Survey, that the average replacement ratio in retire-
ment in the United States is around 64%. But there is considerable variation around this
figure, even among households with similar socioeconomic characteristics. Life-cycle theory
explains this variation in terms of differences in time preference rates, risk tolerance,
exposure to uncertainty, and relative tastes for work and leisure at advanced ages. These
factors have testable implications concerning the relation between accumulated wealth and
the shape of the consumption profile. Bernheim et al. (2001) found little support for these
implications. The data are instead consistent with “rule of thumb,” “mental accounting,” or
hyperbolic discounting theories of wealth accumulation.
To the extent that decisions to defer pension saving do stem from such behavioral biases,
individuals might benefit from commitment mechanisms, such as automatic enrolment of
employees into the pension plan and regular saving plans, designed to mitigate the effects of
the biases. (Benartzi & Thaler, 2004).
4. Modeling the consequences of delayed pension plan participation
Irrespective of whether the decision to defer saving for retirement is based on rational
analysis or behavioral biases, it is important to understand how much an individual needs to
save over different periods to ensure an adequate income in retirement. To address this issue,
we estimate the likely range of retirement incomes from a variety of different DC pension
plan participation profiles. As Booth (2004) notes it is important to consider risk in pension
plan accumulation and the probability of achieving a certain outcome, rather than focusing
only on the most likely result. Hence, we use a stochastic model, which allows us to
understand the distribution of retirement income outcomes. We use data representative of the
UK to illustrate the analysis, but the broad conclusions are likely to hold across most other
national markets where DC pension plans are becoming common.
We take as our benchmark the case of an average U.K. male who joins a pension plan at
age 25 and retires at 65; the current state pension age for a man in the U.K. We assume that
he contributes 10% of his salary each year to the pension plan, based on survey evidence that
this is close to the average combined (i.e., employee plus employer) contribution rate in
occupational DC schemes in the U.K. The Pensions Commission (2004) reports contribution
rates of this magnitude from surveys conducted by the NAPF and the Association of
Consulting Actuaries. Average United States contribution rates appear similar, with Munnell
and Sunden (2006) suggesting that 9% is the typical contribution rate for a 401(k) scheme
member (6% employee; 3% employer match.) While we use the 10% contribution rate in
most of our analyses, we also conduct a sensitivity analysis using alternative rates.
We assume the individual’s career earnings experience matches that of a typical male
employee in the U.K. and to simplify the analysis we further assume that there is no risk to
the accrual of pension benefits arising from unemployment. Fig. 1 shows the age-earnings
profile of the employee, scaled to average male earnings (1.0). The profile incorporates
relatively rapid promotion in the earlier years of the employee’s career, with a peak in the
mid- to late 40s, and below-average promotional increments thereafter. Employees have
above average earnings in their midcareers and below average earnings at the beginning and
end of their careers. In addition to these promotional increments, the employee will also
experience an annual increase in real wages arising from productivity increases over his
career. We assume a 2% per annum increase in real wages, in line with the annual increase
in national average earnings in the U.K. over the postwar period.3
The alternative scenarios we investigate involve delays in joining the pension plan to
various ages between 35 and 55. We document the impact of this deferment on the retirement
income outcome for a 10% contribution rate, and calculate the contribution rate that would
be required to replicate the pension benefits produced by membership from age 25. We also
show the impact of deferring retirement to age 70, given growing comment (e.g., Pensions
Commission, 2004) that increasing longevity should be matched by higher retirement ages,
and of retiring early at age 55, which could happen to an individual as a result of ill health
or redundancy. Finally, we investigate some scenarios for a female pension plan member, in
which we compare an unbroken pension plan participation record with the case where the
woman has a spell out of the labor market to raise a family. To do this, we use the
age-earnings profile of a typical female worker in the U.K.; such a worker’s earnings peak
in her early 30s, around a decade before the average male (see Fig. 2).
The model we use to conduct our analysis is the PensionMetrics model described in detail
in Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2001) and briefly in the appendix. This model uses stochastic
simulation to determine the anticipated distribution of pension outcomes, measured in terms
of the ratio of initial pension to final salary (i.e., the replacement ratio), for any given set of
input parameters such as contribution rate, asset allocation strategy, anticipated retirement
age, and so on, taking into account the stochastic nature of investment returns, interest rates
and salary levels.
With respect to the investment of the pension contributions, we consider four alternative
stylized asset allocation profiles. We investigate a conservative, low-risk strategy that is
100% bonds and a high-risk strategy invested 100% in UK equities. We also consider a
balanced strategy that is 60% equities and 40% bonds, a common asset mix in United States
plans, and a deterministic life-cycle strategy that invests a proportion equal to (100-
member’s age) in equities and the remainder in bonds.4 This life-cycle strategy is designed
to reduce the investment risk borne by the member in the years immediately preceding
retirement, on the grounds that it would be difficult to recover from losses sustained at such
a late stage in the working life. The balanced and life-cycle strategies use annual rebalancing.
Following Byrne, Blake, Cairns and Dowd (2005) we use a combination of historical
Fig. 1. Chart shows the age-real earnings profile for the average male employee in the UK. Earnings follow the
path of the curve as the employee grows older but are also subject to additional real growth on account of
economy-wide productivity gains.
returns data and forward-looking return estimates to parameterise the stochastic model. The
source for the historical returns is the ABN Amro/LBS data set discussed in Dimson, Marsh
and Staunton (2001) and available commercially through Ibbotson Associates. We use data
for the postwar period of 1947 to 2003 to estimate the volatility and correlation structure of
the asset classes (see Table A1 in the Appendix). However, we do not use the historical mean
returns as our estimate of future returns. Instead, we use forward-looking return assumptions
to account for the possibility that the historical realized equity risk premium, defined as the
difference between the average return on equities and the return on Treasury bills, is larger
than can reasonably be expected in future.
We use the forward-looking return estimates because some commentators (e.g., Fama &
French, 2002; Arnott & Bernstein, 2002; Dimson et al., 2001) believe that the realized equity
risk premium over the postwar period is an upward biased estimate of the likely future risk
premium. They argue that high historical equity returns between 1950 and 1999 were mainly
because of: (1) unexpectedly high profitability and hence strong dividend growth and (2) an
unexpected fall in long-term discount rates, the result of a sustained decline in the volatility
of earnings, dividends and returns. Neither of these factors can be relied upon to boost future
equity returns. These commentators conclude that the best estimate of a global equity risk
premium is about 3.5% relative to U.S. Treasury bills, and we use this suggested equity
Fig. 2. Chart shows the age-real earnings profile for the average female employee in the UK. Earnings follow the
path of the curve as the employee grows older but are also subject to additional real growth on account of
economy-wide productivity gains.
premium to produce an alternative set of forward-looking nominal return parameters, which
we adjust for pension plan charges (1.0%) and expected inflation (2.5%).5 We conduct a
sensitivity analysis of our return assumptions later in the paper.
While some pension funds are actively managed, we make no allowance for any (positive
or negative) excess returns generated by active management. We also assume that annual
returns on the assets in the pension fund follow a multivariate normal process.6 The return
parameters are shown in Table 2.
When the plan member reaches retirement age, the accumulated fund is converted into a
single life annuity that provides a level income to him until he dies. The annuity rate is based
on a long-term interest rate consistent with the returns on fixed-income assets earned by the
fund in the year leading up to retirement and with the PMA92 survival probabilities at the
relevant age taken from mortality tables published by the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries:
these reflect the mortality experience of males buying pension annuities from UK life offices.
Where we analyze scenarios for female plan members, we use the corresponding female
mortality tables (PFA92). We do not take account of the possibility of future improvements
in longevity.
We present the results of the simulation in terms of the replacement ratio; that is, the ratio
of initial pension to salary immediately before retirement. Many final salary, DB pension
plans have offered a replacement ratio of 1/60th of final pay for each year worked, up to a
maximum of 40/60ths of final pay. Under such a plan, a worker with 40 years’ service would
therefore get a pension income of two-thirds of final salary. We can use this ratio as a
benchmark for the outcomes from the DC plan.
5. Results and analysis
5.1. The case of an average male
Table 3 shows the distribution of replacement ratios for our benchmark case of a male who
contributes 10% of salary to the pension plan from age 25 to age 65. The results are based
on 5000 simulations using the PensionMetrics model. The median replacement ratio for that
Table 2 Forward-looking return parameters
Nominal Real annual Real annual return
Annual return Gross return Post charges
Equities (UK & global) 7.5% 5.0% 4.0%
Bonds 4.5% 2.0% 1.0%
Cash 4.0% 1.5% 0.5%
Note: Inflation is assumed at 2.5% in line with Bank of England’s target for the Retail Price Index (RPIX). The
1.0% annual charge is now typical of DC pensions in the UK. No allowance is made for any excess returns from
active management. The bond return assumption reflects current market yields. The equity return figure is based
on a market level dividend discount model, where dividends grow in line with GDP, while the cash return is
derived by subtracting a 3.5% equity risk premium from the equity return figure. The approach is consistent with
that used by the UK’s Financial Services Authority (2003).
individual ranges from 0.29, where the contributions are invested only in bonds, to 0.39 for
the 100% equity strategy. The differences in median replacement ratios across the four
investment strategies are, of course, explained by the differing levels of equity content and
the impact this has on the expected investment return. It follows that the median replacement
ratios are also influenced by the expected returns assumed for the various asset classes.
It is also clear from the Table that the pension outcomes are very risky, with the 5%
value-at-risk replacement ratios for starting age 25 ranging from 0.12 to 0.18. The interpre-
tation of these figures is that the individual has a 1-in-20 chance of receiving a replacement
ratio of that amount or less. The ‘low-risk’ strategy of 100% bonds limits the downside
compared with the 100% equity and balanced strategies, but only at the expense of a
significant reduction in the mean and median replacement ratios. This strategy has been
called one of ‘reckless conservatism’ and this description is reinforced by an examination of
the interquartile range. For the 100% bonds strategy, the range is 0.23 to 0.37, the interpre-
tation of which is that there is a 50% probability of the outcome lying in this range. By
contrast, the 100% equity strategy has the same lower bound as bonds but almost twice the
upper bound. The balanced and life-cycle strategies appear to offer relatively attractive
risk-return trade-offs compared to the single asset class strategies. Both have relatively high
median replacement ratios (0.37 and 0.35, respectively), while having a more limited
Table 3 Replacement ratios by age of joining pension plan: male retiring at 65
Start
age
Strategy Median
replacement
ratio
Mean
replacement
ratio
Inter-quartile
VaR range
5% VaR
replacement
ratio
Contribution
rate to
match age
25 start
Contribution
rate for 50%
replacement
ratio
25 100% Bonds 0.29 0.31 0.23–0.37 0.18 — 17.2
Balanced 60:40 0.37 0.44 0.26–0.53 0.16 — 13.5
100% Equities 0.39 0.56 0.23–0.65 0.12 — 12.8
Life-cycle 0.35 0.41 0.26–0.49 0.18 — 14.3
35 100% Bonds 0.25 0.27 0.21–0.31 0.16 11.6 20.0
Balanced 60:40 0.31 0.36 0.22–0.44 0.15 11.9 16.1
100% Equities 0.33 0.43 0.20–0.53 0.11 11.8 15.2
Life-cycle 0.30 0.33 0.23–0.40 0.16 11.7 16.7
45 100% Bonds 0.19 0.20 0.16–0.22 0.13 15.3 26.3
Balanced 60:40 0.22 0.24 0.16–0.28 0.11 16.8 22.7
100% Equities 0.23 0.27 0.15–0.33 0.09 17.0 21.7
Life-cycle 0.21 0.22 0.17–0.26 0.13 16.7 23.8
55 100% Bonds 0.10 0.10 0.09–0.11 0.07 29.0 50.0
Balanced 60:40 0.11 0.11 0.09–0.13 0.07 33.6 45.5
100% Equities 0.11 0.12 0.08–0.14 0.05 35.5 45.5
Life-cycle 0.10 0.11 0.09–0.12 0.07 35.0 50.0
Note: Balanced strategy is 60% equities; 40% bonds with annual rebalancing. Life-cycle strategy invests a
proportion equal to 100  member’s age in equities with the remainder in bonds, with annual adjustment.
Median, mean, inter-quartile VaR range (between 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of replacement
ratios) and 5% VaR (below which 5% of the distribution of replacement ratios fall) all based on the member
contributing 10% of salary throughout pension plan membership. Contribution rate to match age 25 is the
contribution rate required from the later age of joining to replicate median replacement ratio estimated for age 25.
Contribution rate for 50% replacement ratio is that required to have 50% probability of a replacement ratio of at
least 0.50.
downside (5% VaRs of 0.16 and 0.18, respectively.) The life-cycle strategy has better
downside results than the balanced strategy, but loses some of the upside potential (75th
percentile VaRs of 0.49 and 0.53, respectively.) Notably, the life-cycle strategy has the same
5% VaR level as the conservative 100% bonds strategy, but a significantly higher median
replacement ratio.
Table 3 also reveals that delaying pension plan membership beyond age 25 has the
predictable result of shifting downward the range of likely replacement ratios. For example,
deferring membership by ten years to age 35 reduces the median replacement ratio from the
balanced managed strategy from 0.37 to 0.31. The corresponding figures for deferment to
ages 45 and 55 are 0.22 and 0.11, respectively.
An alternative way to look at this is to calculate what level of contribution rate would have
to be paid from these later starting ages to replicate the median replacement ratio generated
by a 10% contribution rate paid from age 25. Using the balanced managed strategy, the
answer to this is 11.9% from age 35, 16.8% from age 45 and 33.6% from age 55, and the
results for the other asset allocation strategies are broadly similar. These results show that
anyone delaying contributing to a pension plan beyond their 30s must devote a very
significant portion of their income to making these ‘catch up’ contributions. Indeed, the
levels of the contributions required from the later starting ages are such that it might not be
possible for individuals on low-to-middle incomes to afford them.7
The increase in the contribution rate required as a result of delaying pension plan
membership is, at first glance, less than might be expected. For example, reducing the
contribution period from 40 to 30 years might be expected to raise the required contribution
rate by 33% (i.e., 40 years contributions need to be spread over 30 years) even before taking
account of the forgone 10 years of investment returns. That the required contribution rate
rises by only 16 to 19% is explained by the employee’s age-earnings profile. Real earnings
rise through most of the employee’s career and thus the percentage increase in contributions
is being applied to a higher level of salary.
The table also shows that even when starting pension contributions at age 25, the median
replacement ratios are well below the ratios targeted by traditional final salary pension plans.
This point is confirmed by the final column of the Table, which shows the contributions
required to have a 50% chance of achieving a replacement ratio of at least 0.50 of final salary
(a common replacement ratio in public sector plans). Again, it is valid to question the
affordability of the contribution rates required by individuals starting pension contributions
at later ages.
Just about the only positive thing that we can say about delaying pension plan membership
is that shorter contribution periods reduce the variability of outcomes. For example, the
interquartile VaR range for the replacement ratio for the balanced managed strategy from age
25 is 0.27. By comparison, for the same strategy from age 55, the range is reduced to 0.04.
However, being more certain about the value of your (very much smaller) pension does not
seem to be a particularly good reason to delay starting to save.
An individual might be able to make a given target replacement ratio more affordable by
retiring at a later age. Table 4 gives the outcomes for the same starting ages and investment
strategies as Table 3, but this time based on the assumption that employment and saving
continue to, and the pension benefits are not taken until, age 70. The age-earnings profile we
have used implies real wage growth declines from the individual’s late-40s until the point of
retirement. To enable an easier comparison with the previous results, we assume the decline
in real wage growth ends at age 65 and the real growth remains steady for the additional five
years of employment. Given that relatively few people currently work beyond age 65, there
is little firm evidence on the true age-earnings profile post-65.
Table 4 shows that replacement ratios at age 70 for given starting ages and contribution
levels are substantially increased, relative to the equivalent scenarios with retirement at age
65. For example, focusing on the balanced managed strategy, the median replacement ratio
increases from 0.37 to 0.47 for someone starting contributing at age 25, while the increase
for someone starting at age 55 is from 0.11 to 0.17. The interquartile ranges also shift up,
although the improvements in the 5% VaR levels are somewhat lower. We might not like the
prospect of working longer and later into life, but it is clearly an effective way of improving
the affordability of pensions. The benefit in terms of lower required contributions for any
target level of retirement income can be seen in the final column of the Table, which
illustrates required contributions for a 0.50 replacement ratio. For an individual starting
paying into the pension plan at age 55 and using the balanced managed strategy, the required
contribution rate to achieve this replacement ratio for retirement at age 65 is 45.5% of salary,
but this falls to 29.4% of salary if retirement is postponed to age 70.
Table 4 Replacement ratios by age of joining pension plan: male retiring at 70
Start
age
Strategy Median
replacement
ratio
Mean
replacement
ratio
Inter-quartile
VaR range
5% VaR
replacement
ratio
Contribution
rate to
match age
25 start
Contribution
rate for 50%
replacement
ratio
25 100% Bonds 0.36 0.40 0.28–0.48 0.20 — 13.9
Balanced 60:40 0.47 0.58 0.32–0.71 0.19 — 10.6
100% Equities 0.50 0.76 0.29–0.90 0.14 — 10.0
Life-cycle 0.45 0.53 0.33–0.64 0.21 — 11.1
35 100% Bonds 0.32 0.35 0.26–0.42 0.19 11.3 15.6
Balanced 60:40 0.41 0.49 0.29–0.60 0.18 11.5 12.2
100% Equities 0.43 0.61 0.26–0.74 0.13 11.6 11.6
Life-cycle 0.39 0.44 0.29–0.53 0.20 11.5 12.8
45 100% Bonds 0.25 0.27 0.21–0.31 0.16 14.4 20.0
Balanced 60:40 0.30 0.34 0.22–0.42 0.15 15.7 16.7
100% Equities 0.31 0.40 0.20–0.49 0.11 16.1 16.1
Life-cycle 0.29 0.31 0.23–0.38 0.16 15.5 17.2
55 100% Bonds 0.15 0.16 0.13–0.18 0.11 24.0 33.3
Balanced 60:40 0.17 0.19 0.14–0.22 0.10 27.6 29.4
100% Equities 0.18 0.21 0.13–0.25 0.08 27.8 27.8
Life-cycle 0.17 0.18 0.14–0.20 0.11 26.5 29.4
Note: Balanced strategy is 60% equities; 40% bonds with annual rebalancing. Life-cycle strategy invests a
proportion equal to 100  member’s age in equities with the remainder in bonds, with annual adjustment.
Median, mean, inter-quartile VaR range (between 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of replacement
ratios) and 5% VaR (below which 5% of the distribution of replacement ratios fall) all based on the member
contributing 10% of salary throughout pension plan membership. Contribution rate to match age 25 is the
contribution rate required from the later age of joining to replicate median replacement ratio estimated for age 25.
Contribution rate for 50% replacement ratio is that required to have 50% probability of a replacement ratio of at
least 0.50.
The impact of deferring retirement is the result of contributions being paid for five years
longer and the annuity rate increasing to take account of the reduced period for which the
pension is expected to be paid given the more advanced age at purchase. However, it is
important to note that the life expectancy of a 70 year old is unlikely to be a full five years
less than that of a 65 year old. The fact that an individual has survived an extra five years
tends to indicate a higher chance of prolonged life, a feature of mortality statistics that is
cheerfully known in the annuity industry as “mortality drag.”
Naturally enough, retiring earlier will have the opposite effect. The results for
retirement at age 55 are shown in Table 5. The median replacement ratio for someone
retiring at age 55, having contributed 10% of salary to the balanced managed strategy
since age 25, is 0.17, with an interquartile range of 0.13 to 0.22. The comparable figure
for a retirement age of 65 is 0.37, with an interquartile range of 0.26 to 0.53. The
required contribution rates for a 0.50 replacement ratio at age 55 are all at least 50%
greater than the corresponding rates required for retirement at age 65. Early retirement
is, therefore, extremely costly.
The situation is particularly unfortunate for those who start retirement saving late, but then
find themselves out of work in their 50s. The only potential mitigating factor is that if an
individual is forced to retire on the grounds of ill-health, they may be eligible for an
‘enhanced’ or ‘impaired life’ annuity. This would take account of their reduced life expect-
ancy and offer a higher rate of income than the rates used in our modeling.
Table 5 Replacement ratios by age of joining pension plan: male retiring at 55
Start
age
Strategy Median
replacement
ratio
Mean
replacement
ratio
Inter-quartile
VaR range
5% VaR
replacement
ratio
Contribution
rate to
match age
25 start
Contribution
rate for 50%
replacement
ratio
25 100% Bonds 0.14 0.15 0.12–0.17 0.10 — 35.7
Balanced 60:40 0.17 0.19 0.13–0.22 0.09 — 29.4
100% Equities 0.17 0.22 0.12–0.27 0.07 — 29.4
Life-cycle 0.17 0.18 0.13–0.22 0.09 — 29.4
35 100% Bonds 0.11 0.12 0.10–0.13 0.09 12.7 45.5
Balanced 60:40 0.13 0.14 0.10–0.17 0.08 13.1 38.5
100% Equities 0.14 0.16 0.09–0.20 0.06 12.1 35.7
Life-cycle 0.13 0.14 0.10–0.16 0.08 13.1 38.5
45 100% Bonds 0.07 0.07 0.06–0.07 0.05 20.0 71.4
Balanced 60:40 0.07 0.07 0.06–0.09 0.05 24.3 71.4
100% Equities 0.07 0.08 0.06–0.10 0.04 24.3 71.4
Life-cycle 0.07 0.07 0.06–0.08 0.05 24.3 71.4
Note: Balanced strategy is 60% equities; 40% bonds with annual rebalancing. Life-cycle strategy invests a
proportion equal to 100  member’s age in equities with the remainder in bonds, with annual adjustment.
Median, mean, inter-quartile VaR range (between 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of replacement
ratios) and 5% VaR (below which 5% of the distribution of replacement ratios fall) all based on the member
contributing 10% of salary throughout pension plan membership. Contribution rate to match age 25 is the
contribution rate required from the later age of joining to replicate median replacement ratio estimated for age 25.
Contribution rate for 50% replacement ratio is that required to have 50% probability of a replacement ratio of at
least 0.50.
5.2.
quate pension provision. Of course, women often face the additional problem of having
lower salary incomes as well.
5.3. Sensitivity analysis
5.3.1. Equity risk premium
The results above are conditional on the assumed values for the parameters of the model.
The most important of these is the size of the equity risk premium. We selected a value of
3.5% on the grounds that this value is supported by the recent literature as a forward-looking
estimate. Naturally, with a more optimistic equity risk premium, the distribution of replace-
ment ratios will be shifted upwards, and vice versa. Table 7 shows the extent of these shifts
when the equity risk premium is reduced to 1.5% or raised to 5.5%. Clearly, only the
balanced, life cycle and 100% equity strategies are affected, but the effect is significant. With
a start age of 25 and a balanced strategy, the median replacement ratio falls by 19% from
0.37 to 0.30 when the equity risk premium drops to 1.5%, and increases by 24% from 0.37
to 0.46 when the equity risk premium rises to 5.5%. The corresponding changes for the 100%
equity strategy are a 28% fall and a 44% increase. The percentage changes are smaller at
higher starting ages. Nevertheless the Table gives a flavor of the extent of the uncertainty
Table 7 Sensitivity analysis of the equity risk premium: replacement ratios by age of joining pension plan:
male retiring at 65
Start
age
Strategy Equity risk premium (relative to T-bills)
1.5% 3.5% 5.5%
Median
replacement
ratio
Inter-quartile
VaR range
Median
replacement
ratio
Inter-quartile
VaR range
Median
replacement
ratio
Inter-quartile
VaR range
25 100% Bonds 0.29 0.23–0.37 0.29 0.23–0.37 0.29 0.23–0.37
Balanced 60:40 0.30 0.21–0.42 0.37 0.26–0.53 0.46 0.31–0.67
100% Equities 0.28 0.17–0.45 0.39 0.23–0.65 0.56 0.33–0.98
Life-cycle 0.30 0.23–0.41 0.35 0.26–0.49 0.42 0.31–0.58
35 100% Bonds 0.25 0.21–0.31 0.25 0.21–0.31 0.25 0.21–0.31
Balanced 60:40 0.26 0.19–0.36 0.31 0.22–0.44 0.37 0.27–0.53
100% Equities 0.25 0.16–0.39 0.33 0.20–0.53 0.44 0.27–0.73
Life-cycle 0.26 0.20–0.35 0.30 0.23–0.40 0.34 0.26–0.46
45 100% Bonds 0.19 0.16–0.22 0.19 0.16–0.22 0.19 0.16–0.22
Balanced 60:40 0.19 0.15–0.25 0.22 0.16–0.28 0.25 0.19–0.33
100% Equities 0.18 0.12–0.27 0.23 0.15–0.33 0.28 0.18–0.42
Life-cycle 0.19 0.15–0.24 0.21 0.17–0.26 0.23 0.18–0.29
55 100% Bonds 0.10 0.09–0.11 0.10 0.09–0.11 0.10 0.09–0.11
Balanced 60:40 0.10 0.08–0.12 0.11 0.09–0.13 0.11 0.09–0.14
100% Equities 0.10 0.07–0.13 0.11 0.08–0.14 0.12 0.09–0.16
Life-cycle 0.10 0.08–0.11 0.10 0.09–0.12 0.11 0.09–0.13
Note: Balanced strategy is 60% equities; 40% bonds with annual rebalancing. Life-cycle strategy invests a
proportion equal to 100  member’s age in equities with the remainder in bonds, with annual adjustment.
Median, mean, inter-quartile VaR range (between 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of replacement
ratios) and 5% VaR (below which 5% of the distribution of replacement ratios fall) all based on the member
contributing 10% of salary throughout pension plan membership.
attached to the pension from DC plans as a consequence of one of the key determinants of
differential returns.
5.3.2. Contribution rates
Our final sensitivity analysis focuses on the member’s contribution rate. We have assumed
in previous analyses that the member contributes a constant 10% of salary throughout his or
her period of scheme membership. This assumption was based on survey evidence that 10%
is close to the average contribution rate for these types of schemes. However, many scheme
members save less than 10%, while it is also open to most members to raise their contri-
butions above 10%, assuming they have sufficient spare income to do so. Table 8 shows
replacement ratios (median and interquartile VaR ranges) for retirement at 65 with various
joining ages based on contribution rates of 5%, 10%, and 15% of salary. Raising the
contribution level has the predictable result of raising the median replacement ratio and all
of the distribution values listed in the Table. In fact, the values scale perfectly, a 50% higher
contribution rate produces a 50% higher replacement ratio. The interquartile range shifts up
and widens by a factor of 50%, as the 25th and 75th percentiles rise by 50%. Raising
contribution levels is, like working longer, a powerful way to improve the adequacy of an
individual’s retirement income provision, albeit one which may not be viewed as attractive
by the individual.
Table 8 Sensitivity analysis of the contribution rate: replacement ratios by age of joining pension plan: male
retiring at 65
Start
age
Strategy Contribution rate (% of salary)
5% 10% 15%
Median
replacement
ratio
Inter-quartile
VaR range
Median
replacement
ratio
Inter-quartile
VaR range
Median
replacement
ratio
Inter-quartile
VaR range
25 100% Bonds 0.15 0.12–0.19 0.29 0.23–0.37 0.44 0.35–0.56
Balanced 60:40 0.19 0.13–0.27 0.37 0.26–0.53 0.56 0.39–0.80
100% Equities 0.20 0.12–0.33 0.39 0.23–0.65 0.59 0.35–0.98
Life-cycle 0.18 0.13–0.25 0.35 0.26–0.49 0.53 0.39–0.74
35 100% Bonds 0.13 0.11–0.16 0.25 0.21–0.31 0.38 0.32–0.47
Balanced 60:40 0.16 0.11–0.22 0.31 0.22–0.44 0.47 0.33–0.66
100% Equities 0.17 0.10–0.27 0.33 0.20–0.53 0.50 0.30–0.80
Life-cycle 0.15 0.12–0.20 0.30 0.23–0.40 0.45 0.35–0.60
45 100% Bonds 0.10 0.08–0.11 0.19 0.16–0.22 0.29 0.24–0.33
Balanced 60:40 0.11 0.08–0.14 0.22 0.16–0.28 0.33 0.24–0.42
100% Equities 0.12 0.08–0.17 0.23 0.15–0.33 0.35 0.23–0.50
Life-cycle 0.11 0.09–0.13 0.21 0.17–0.26 0.32 0.26–0.39
55 100% Bonds 0.05 0.05–0.06 0.10 0.09–0.11 0.15 0.14–0.17
Balanced 60:40 0.06 0.05–0.07 0.11 0.09–0.13 0.17 0.14–0.20
100% Equities 0.06 0.04–0.07 0.11 0.08–0.14 0.17 0.12–0.21
Life-cycle 0.05 0.05–0.06 0.10 0.09–0.12 0.15 0.14–0.18
Note: Balanced strategy is 60% equities; 40% bonds with annual rebalancing. Life-cycle strategy invests a
proportion equal to 100  member’s age in equities with the remainder in bonds, with annual adjustment. Median
and inter-quartile VaR range all based on the member contributing the specified percentage of salary throughout
pension plan membership. The analysis uses an equity risk premium of 3.5% relative to T-bills.
6. Conclusions
Many individuals delay starting to contribute to a pension plan until well into their
working lives. This might be because they are waiting for their income to increase above
their perceived permanent income (as in ‘life-cycle’ theory), or because they are paying off
university or mortgage loans or raising a family, or because of procrastination. They may
simply be risk averse and prefer the certainty of consumption now to the possibility of
consumption in the future. In this paper, we have analyzed likely retirement incomes for
someone starting to contribute to a pension plan from age 25 and calculated the additional
contributions that someone starting saving later in life has to make to ‘catch up’. These
catch-up contributions are large, and in some cases, so large that it is difficult to imagine that
they are affordable for anyone not on a high income. Deferring retirement to a later age goes
some way to easing the burden of annual contributions, but is not always possible; in any
case, working longer is a solution that many people would rather avoid.
The results suggest people should start saving for a pension as soon as possible and raise
the question of how they can be helped to do so. In the UK, the Pensions Commission (2004,
2005) has published extensive analysis of possible approaches to improve pension saving.
Compulsion, simply requiring by law that everyone saves for a pension, is a relatively
extreme answer that may bring its own problems. Less rigid ‘behavioral’ mechanisms, such
as automatically enrolling employees in their employer’s pension plan while continuing to
give them the right to opt out, have been shown to be effective in raising pension plan
participation rates (Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick, 2002) and may represent a better
alternative. The Pensions Commission (2005) has suggested that automatic enrollment
should be used in a planned new national pension savings scheme, for employees without
adequate existing pension provision.
Education and advice for employees will probably also be required. It seems reasonable
to believe that at least some employees would be spurred into action if they were aware of,
and understood the implications of, statistics like the dismal ones we have presented in this
paper. Financial planners and advisors have a key role to play in this education process.
Appendix: The PensionMetrics simulation model
The PensionMetrics (PM) accumulation model is a stochastic simulation model whose
purpose is to investigate the design of DC pension plans. In a DC scheme, pension
contributions from the plan member and his or her employer are invested in a portfolio of
assets. The returns on the assets will be stochastic and some assets will have more volatile
returns than others. The DC pension fund will therefore grow in a stochastic fashion too.
The PM model generates a range of outcomes (i.e., a probability distribution function) for
the value of the replacement pension from the accrued DC pension fund on the retirement
date of the plan member. The replacement ratio is calculated as the ratio of the pension from
the DC fund to the plan member’s final salary. The pension from the DC fund is, in turn,
calculated as the ratio of the value of the DC fund to the annuity factor. The annuity factor
is the expected present value of an annual pension of one unit from retirement until death and
depends on both the interest rates ruling at the time of retirement and estimates of the
survival probabilities of the plan member for each year after retirement. These survival
probabilities are taken from the PMA92 and PFA92 tables of mortality rates produced by the
Institute and Faculty of Actuaries that are based on the mortality experience of respectively
male and female pensioner annuitants in the UK in the early 1990s.
The model requires assumptions about both risk factors and control factors. The first risk
factor relates to real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) asset returns. The benchmark asset returns
model we use is a multivariate normal model, with the variance-covariance matrix calibrated
using time series returns on assets over the postwar period. Experimentation has shown that
the particular asset returns model used makes little difference to the distribution of pension
outcomes, except in the extreme tails of the distribution. In this study, therefore, we just
report results from the benchmark multivariate normal model. The historical return and
correlation parameters are shown in Table A1 below. The mean returns we use are based on
a forward-looking analysis of the equity risk premium, which is described in Section 4, with
the parameter values shown in Table 2.
The second risk factor relates to interest rates. We need to model the evolution of interest
rates over time to forecast the annuity factor at retirement. The interest rate model that we
use is based on the Vasicek (1977) model that links bond returns and bond yields in a
consistent manner.
The third risk factor is earnings. Earnings are modeled using the age-earnings profile (or
salary scale) of the plan member. This shows how salary varies with age in the plan
member’s profession at a given point in time. We assume that an individual’s salary over his
or her career follows the same profile as the rest of his or her profession (that, in general, will
be gender specific), but is subject to annual uprating in line with the real growth in national
average earnings. In this study, we use the profile of the average male and female employee
in the UK.
The final risk factor is unemployment. This is modeled as a binary variable (1: employed,
0: unemployed) for each period, with an age-dependent probability of unemployment, for
Table A1 Real returns and earnings growth 1947 to 2003
UK UK UK US UK real Earnings
T-bills Equities Bonds Equities Growth
Mean return
(arithmetic %)
1.19% 9.18% 1.79% 8.71% 2.07%
Standard deviation
(annual %)
3.99% 23.22% 13.31% 21.04% 2.00%
Correlation matrix
UK T-bills 1.000
UK equities 0.051 1.000
UK bonds 0.465 0.513 1.000
US equities 0.136 0.576 0.253 1.000
UK real earnings 0.049 0.026 0.347 0.045 1.000
Source: returns from ABN Amro/LBS data from Ibbotson Associates (Dimson et al., 2001). Earnings data from
the Office for National Statistics.
example, taken from national average unemployment rates at different ages. However, in this
study, for reasons of simplicity, we assume the unemployment probability is zero.
There are three control variables; variables that are set by either the pension plan member
or the pension plan provider in each period of the model. The first is the pension fund
contribution rate, which we assume to be a constant proportion of the plan member’s income
for the whole period. We use 10% in this study.
The second is the asset allocation that is the key control variable in the model, since
experiments show that it dominates the distribution of pension outcomes. This study inves-
tigates four stylized asset allocation profiles: a 100% bonds strategy; a 100% UK equities
strategy; a ‘balanced managed’ strategy, invested in equities (60%) and bonds (40%); and a
deterministic life-cycle strategy that invests a proportion (100-member’s age) in equities and
the remainder in bonds. The latter two strategies use annual rebalancing.
The third control variable is the retirement age. The base retirement age is set at 65.
However, we experiment with different retirement ages.
Having specified all the risk and control factors, we use the model to perform thousands
of simulations of the stochastic variables, such as the asset returns and interest rates, and then
generate an empirical distribution of possible replacement ratios for the plan member’s
selected retirement date.
A replacement ratio of unity implies that the particular DC pension plan has fully
replicated the plan member’s final salary. However, the generated distribution of replacement
ratios will typically be quite wide. To make a suitable comparison, we need to specify one
or more percentiles from the distribution and then compare these values with the target
pension ratio of unity. The ith percentile of this distribution is also known as the value-at-risk
(VaR) at the (100 – i)th confidence level.
Notes
1. However, this tells us nothing about the behavior of the 34% of employees who are
either not eligible to join their employer’s plan, or who work for an employer which
does not offer a pension plan.
2. In other words, individuals use hyperbolic rather than exponential discounting.
3. The impact of differing career salary profiles, by gender and by type of occupation,
on the retirement income from DC pensions is discussed in detail in Blake, Cairns and
Dowd (2004). For simplicity, in this paper we focus on one age-earnings profile,
namely that of a typical male, but it is also clear that many of our results carry over
to female workers, or workers in specific occupations. Some results for females are
also presented in Table 6.
4. We thank the reviewer for suggesting the latter two strategies. Notably, in the UK
“balanced” strategies tend to have higher equity content (80%) than in the United
States, while life-cycle products tend to switch from equity to bonds only in the last
five years before planned retirement. See Byrne et al. (2005) for a discussion.
5. UK legislation for ‘stakeholder’ DC pensions capped annual charges at 1% per annum
and this has become a common charge rate for DC plans in the UK. The inflation rate
we assume is consistent with the target set by the government for the Bank of
England.
6. This was the simplest of the seven asset return models used in Blake et al. (2001).
That study showed that the specification of the asset-return process had relatively little
impact on the estimated pension outcome.
7. In some cases, legislative limits may also limit contributions into tax-favored pen-
sions vehicles to an amount less than the rates we have calculated. However, recent
changes in UK regulations mean that individuals can now pay up to 100% of salary
each year into a pension plan, subject to an annual contribution limit of £215,000 and
an overall pension fund cap of £1.5m. Hence, most individuals in the UK are not now
constrained, other than by their income, in what they can pay into their pension plan.
8. ONS statistics show that the mean age amongst married women in the UK for the
birth of a first child is 29.9 years, and for the second child 31.5 years.
9. The woman rejoins at the salary she would have received had she remained in
continuous employment.
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